Sun, 04 Aug 2013 10:39:04 GMT
1500年到1800年间中国是世界上最大的经济体，但在1820年到1950年间经历了急剧下滑，一直到1978年后重新攀升。经过三十多年的发展，现在的中国是仅次于美国的第二大经济体，世界500强企业里中国占了61家。 unprecedented expansion of the global middle class (by one estimate, from less than 1.8 billion people in 2009 to about 5 billion in 2030, of whom nearly two-thirds will be in Asia). That expansion will trigger an explosion in demand for housing and consumer durables, including automobiles. Notwithstanding the potential for rapid growth in emerging markets, there are also reasons to believe that growth in developing countries, including China, will slow. First, as populations age, the growth rate of the labor force will slow, and in some countries (such as China and the Russian Federation) will even decline, leading to higher dependency ratios and lower savings and investment. Second, although emerging market economies will retain a comparative advantage in manufacturing, rising unit labor costs will further increase their relative share of services; overall growth would thus slow because productivity growth in services is usually lower than in manufacturing. Technological breakthroughs, unpredictable as they may be, are more likely in some areas, such as clean water, energy storage, and biotechnologies, than in others. A breakthrough in clean coal technologies would give China an obvious advantage, given its huge coal reserves. Indeed, we expect GDP growth to decline gradually from an average near 8.5 percent in 2011–15 to around 5 percent in 2026–30 (see table O.1). One reason for the slowdown is that much of the growth contribution from shifting resources from agriculture to industry has already occurred. And going forward, the continued accumulation of capital, although sizable, will inevitably contribute less to growth as the capital-labor ratio rises (even though capital stock per worker, now an estimated 8.7 percent of the U.S. level, underscores the need for further capital accumulation). Moreover, China is poised to go through wrenching demographic change: the old age dependency ratio will double in the next two decades, reaching the current level in Norway and the Netherlands by 2030 (between 22 and 23 percent);7 and the size of China’s labor force is projected to start shrinking as soon as 2015. Yet workers will become more productive as physical and human capital stock per worker continues to rise. Finally, total factor productivity (TFP) growth—a measure of improvements in economic efficiency and technological progress—has also declined, in part because the economy has exhausted gains from first-generation policy reforms and the absorption of imported technologies. As a result, the distance to the technological frontier has shrunk, and second-generation policy reforms are likely to have a smaller impact on growth.8 At the same time, however, the external capital account will show a rising deficit as Chinese savings flow abroad in search of better returns and to counter protectionist pressures abroad. This trend will serve not only to keep in check further accumulation of external reserves but also to facilitate the transformation of Chinese enterprises into global players. If successful, the energy and commodity intensity of production is expected to decline significantly by 2030 for three reasons: a smaller share of industry in GDP; a smaller share of resource- and pollution-intensive firms in the industrial sector; and better pricing of energy, commodities, and environmental services. Indeed, just as in the 1980s and 1990s when hundreds of millions of unskilled Chinese workers joined the global labor force as part of China’s “opening up” strategy, so too will tens of millions of tertiary-educated Chinese workers join the global workforce to significantly expand the global supply of skill-intensive products. Indeed, the number of college graduates could swell by 200 million over the next two decades—more than the entire labor force of the United States. And finally, China’s urbanization—a driver of much of China’s increased global competitiveness—is poised to grow rapidly. Over the coming two decades, the increase in the urban population will be the equivalent of more than one Tokyo or Buenos Aires each year as the share of urban residents in the total population climbs from about onehalf to near two-thirds in 2030.10 收入两极化的问题将从三个方面来调整。首先是加快中西部的发展，然后是城市新移民收入的快速提高以及公平的机会，另一个原因是由农业向工业的结构调整的放缓会使人口由农村转移向城市的趋势会放缓。城市农村收入比将从现在的3.2倍调整到2.4倍(2030年)。 中国的总劳动人口将从2015年开始下降， 逐渐壮大的第三方教育机构将会促进向劳动力密集型工业的转化。 接下来的20年内将会多出2亿的大学毕业生。这比整个美国的劳动人口都多。 城市人口比例在1978年的时候只有五分之一，现在是一半左右，到了2030年，预计城市人口比例将上升到2/3，相当于会有1.3亿的人进城，这也会带来巨大的增长的动力。 机遇：中产人口的迅速膨胀将会带来很多需求，包括耐用消费品（寿命较长购买次数少的产品，像家用电器、家具、汽车等），奢侈品，住房以及更好的医疗保障和教育。 后金融危机以及欧债危机等外部问题，加上自身转型过程中的各种挑战，将使借来下5年的经济形势尤其危险。 接下来十年GDP会逐渐下降到6%左右（这也足以是中国在2030年进入高收入水平国家的行列）。但是下降过程中仍然有财政/金融危机的风险，并且这难以预测。另一个很大的风险是结构性调整的失误可能会使中国陷入中等收入陷阱（Middle-income Trap）。典型的陷入中等收入陷阱的国家包括南非和巴西。 拉丁美洲和中东地区的国家是中等收入陷阱理论的主要现实论据。这些国家大多数在1960到70年代达到中等收入水平（像现在的中国），但直到今天都一直处在这样的水平上。在1960年的这101个中等收入经济体中，只有为数不多的几个进入到发达经济体的行列，他们是：香港，台湾，新加坡，韩国，日本，爱尔兰，希腊，西班牙，以色列，毛里求斯，波多黎各，赤道几内亚。 中等收入陷阱简单说来，就是从低生产率的农业和低端制造业向高端制造业转型的失败造成的。收入上升到中等水平后劳动力廉价优势不复存在，低端制造业收到冲击，此时有没有积累足够的技术和创新积累，无法形成新的核心竞争力，于是陷入发展困境。 日本和韩国分别在60年和80年代经历了一段高速发展期。 China will grow old before it grows rich. China is home to more than a million millionaires,11 while more than 170 million live on less than $2 a day. Some urban centers have already made this leap and are becoming recognized knowledge and innovation centers—opto-electronics for Wuhan, aviation for Chengdu, financial and engineering services for Shanghai, logistics and business services for Shenzhen, information technology (IT) and software for Beijing—and should be supported in becoming centers of excellence.